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In this paper, we present an approach to
machine translation rooted in pragmatic1.
It is an approach which relies on:
• the use of context to interpret source
language utterances and to produce
target language correlates,
• a context of the utterance which
crucially includes nested beliefs
environments which are constructed and
modified through ascription during
processing,
• knowledge of the world which is
accessed for constructing or modifying
the context,
• context-sensitive (non-monotonic)
inferencing within the context to resolve
ambiguities during interpretation or to
select expressions during production.
In Section 1, we will begin the discussion
by motivating the need for a pragmatics-
based approach which takes into account
the beliefs of the participants in the
translation process by focussing on one
example. In Section 2, we show that such
examples are not isolated instances but
pervade translations. We show that there
are patterns of differences in multiple
translations of the same text which are
related to different global interpretations of
what the text itself is about or to differing
world views on the part of the translators.
In Section 3, we present a number of
concepts related to translation from a
pragmatics-based perspective and suggest a
possible computational framework for
implementing such an approach. In the final
section, we conclude by discussing the
implications of a pragmatics-based
approach for translation analysis,
translation evaluation and for future
directions in machine translation research.
This discussion represents a summary of
work presented in more detail in Farwell
and Helmreich (1993, 1995, 1996, 1997 and
1998).
Section 1
In this section, we argue for a pragmatics-
based approach to machine translation. The
need for pragmatics in Natural Language
Processing and Machine Translation has
long been recognized (Bar-Hillel 1960,
Wilks 1975, Nirenburg et al. 1992). Yet
pragmatics (as the study of language in
context) is often difficult to distinguish
from semantics (the study of the connection
between the language sign system and the
world it represents)2. The history of
Machine Translation shows a progression
towards systems containing more and more
knowledge in order to represent the
meaning of the source text. We take as a
1. Work on this project was supported under DOD
grant: MDA904-92-C-5189.
2. Many theorists such as Pustejovsky (1991),
Lakoff (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987),
or Nirenburg (1987) appear to us to coalesce
language meaning with language use and thus
are interested in semantics. Other theorists such
as Fauconnier (1985), Green (1984), or Nunberg
(1978), place emphasis on the issues of lan-
guage use and appear to us to attempt to sub-
sume semantics within pragmatics.
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point of departure the Pangloss/
Mikrokosmos project which represents the
most consistent, large-scale attempt to
develop a knowledge-based, interlingual
machine translation system to date
(Pangloss 1994).
As might be expected, various pragmatic
issues have been addressed within the
Pangloss system. The Mikrokosmos MT
engine, for example, monitors and uses
information about speakers and hearers,
discourse structure, and world knowledge
in constructing its interlingual
representation of an input text (Attardo
1994, Carlson & Nirenburg 1990). It can
handle metonymic constructions and
metaphors (Onyshkevych & Nirenburg
1994). However, we suggest that it is still a
semantics-based system. Even though
contextual information and world-
knowledge are both represented and used
inferentially, the goal is to produce a
semantic representation of the text.
Language, however, is used not simply to
report events in the world. It is also used to
convey the rich mental models that
individuals and cultures bring to bear on the
communication process. It is the claim of a
pragmatics-based approach that texts do not
have meanings, but rather that in producing
texts, people intend meanings. Thus, a text
can only be approached through an
interpretation. That is to say, the translator
attempts to understand the author's intent in
creating the source text for the original
audience and then recreates, to the extent
possible, that intent for the target audience
using the target language3.
This pragmatics-based approach, then,
focuses on providing interpretations of a
text that insure a coherent account of the
intent behind the text. Such an approach
relies heavily on representations of the
beliefs and other mental attitudes (such as
expectations, hopes, likes, and dislikes) of
the participants in the communicative
process: the author, the translator, and their
respective audiences (the addressees).4 In
particular, then, we require a system that
can model:
• the translator's beliefs,
• the translator's beliefs about the author's
beliefs,
• the translator's beliefs about the author's
beliefs about the (source language)
addressee's beliefs,
• the translator's beliefs about the (target
language) addressee's beliefs.
Such system models can be found in the
work on ViewGen (Ballim & Wilks 1991),
a system which constructs beliefs spaces for
any number of agents about any number of
topics. In addition, we find a computational
basis for the required inferencing in the
work associated the ATT-Meta system
(Barnden et al. 1994). This system includes
a default inference mechanism, an
epistemic logic involving four possible
positive truth conditions (certain, default,
probable, and possible), a truth maintenance
system, metaphorical pretense cocoons (for
treating metaphors as true), and simulative
reasoning (for inferencing within embedded
belief states).
Motivating Pragmatics-based
Translation
For the sake of exposition within a limited
space, we motivate the need for a
pragmatics-based approach by way of a
case involving the translation of a single
3. We do not suggest this as a psychological model
of translation. Translation, we believe, is an art
or skill and not a faculty (in the sense of Fodor
1984) and can therefore be approached in any
number of different ways. We suggest only that
this is a plausible and appropriate model for
computational representation.
As is obvious here and throughout this article,
the influence of the work of Grice (1975) is
clear. Implicatures and inferences from "what is
said" are as fully part of the communication as
the semantic content of the utterance itself.
4. In this paper we will use the term “belief” to
refer to any epistemic state. We do not distin-
guish (except by degree of commitment)
between beliefs, knowledge, hypotheses, and
thoughts. For us, they are all beliefs, though of
course, held with different degrees of tenacity.
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French noun phrase, taken from a subtitled
motion picture, Jesus of Montreal (Arcand
1989). We have devised all the alternative
translations except for the original subtitle.
We discuss three alternative translations
which stem from (a) alternative views of the
beliefs of the film's audience (the
addressees of the translation) and (b)
alternative views of the translator's beliefs
about the world.
We will simplify matters by assuming that
the translator is sitting beside us
interpreting the film as it develops, each
character an independent agent. Thus, for
any given utterance, there are four relevant
participants: the actor who speaks, the actor
who is addressed, the translator and the
audience (the addressees of the translation).
We also ignore the additional complexities
involved in the fact that both actors are also
speaking in some sense on behalf of the
author of the screen play to the film’s
original audience.
As background (i.e., that part of the context
of which the protagonists, the translator and
the film's audience are all aware), we
provide the following synopsis.
A priest at a shrine outside Montreal has
been sponsoring a religious drama every
summer for 35 years. Since the text has
become somewhat outdated, he asks
Coulombe, a young actor who has recently
returned from an extended sojourn, to
modernize the script and to play the part of
Jesus. He agrees and immediately sets about
looking for collaborators. The priest
suggests that Constance, an old friend of
Coulombe’s, would be a good person for
Coulombe to enlist in his endeavor and so
he seeks her out. She agrees to work with
him, and, in passing, invites him to stay at
her apartment. He agrees.
In a later scene, the scene of our attention,
Coulombe returns earlier than usual to what
he assumes is an empty apartment. He starts
to make himself comfortable, making some
noise in the process. At this point he hears
someone moving about in Constance's
bedroom and, suddenly, she emerges from
within, closing the door behind her. She
says, T'es déjà là, toi? (Back already?) and
then, coughing significantly, says to herself,
Bon... (Okay...). At this point Coulombe
realizes that there may be someone else in
the bedroom and whispers, Tu veux que je
m'en aille? (Should I go?). She shakes her
head no, laughs nervously, opens the door
and says to whomever is inside, Ben,
écoutes, sors (Come on out), On va pas
jouer une scène de Feydeau (This isn't a
bedroom farce).
It is this last utterance and its subtitle that
we wish focus on. The translator who
provided the subtitles for the film has
glossed On va pas jouer une scène de
Feydeau as This isn't a bedroom farce. This
is not the only possible translation, of
course, and we look at alternatives so as to
draw out the underlying assumptions that
determined the translator's choices.
At the time of Constance's utterance, the
protagonists, the translator and the audience
have the following beliefs (among others).
Coulombe is living in Constance's
apartment.
They are clearly close friends and
colleagues.
Coulombe has entered the apartment
unexpectedly early.
It is still mid-afternoon.
He accidentally makes a loud noise.
Constance emerges from her bedroom
dressed in a nightgown and closes the
door behind her.
She is somewhat flustered by
Coulombe's unexpected presence.
Coulombe believes there is someone
else in Constance's bedroom that he
has caught them in a compromising
situation.
Coulombe believes that Constance and
the other person might prefer some
privacy.
Coulombe believes that if Constance and
the other person might wish to keep
the identity of the other secret.
Constance believes that Coulombe
believes that she and the other have
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been caught in a compromising
situation.
Constance believes that Coulombe
believes that they might prefer some
privacy.
Constance wishes to change
Coulombe's belief.
Constance tells Coulombe not to leave.
Constance tells the person in the
bedroom to come out and show him/
herself.
Without going into the details, the analysis
of the utterance begins by establishing, on
linguistic grounds, that Constance is using
on va pas jouer to express to the person in
the bedroom that she does not wish the
current situation (such as Coulombe's
discovery of her and the unknown person
alone together in her bedroom) to be
understood as being of a to-be-determined
type of play (i.e., we're not playing ..., we're
not going to play ...). The next step is to
assign an interpretation to un scène de
Feydeau. Again, on linguistic grounds,
coupled in this case with knowledge of the
world, we establish that Constance is using
un scène de Feydeau to refer to the type of
situation that might be used as a scene in a
play by the 19th century French playwright
Feydeau who wrote bedroom farces (i.e., a
scene from a bedroom farce). To arrive at
this interpretation, it must be the case that:
Constance believes Feydeau is a
playwright and that Feydeau wrote
bedroom farces.
Constance believes the person in her
bedroom believes Feydeau is a
playwright and that Feydeau wrote
bedroom farces.
The interpretation is completed by
confirming that the situation under
discussion (i.e., Constance and someone
alone together in her bedroom) is indeed
one that Feydeau may have written about.
This becomes especially plausible when it
turns out that the man in Constance's room
is a priest, in fact, the very same priest who
hired Coulombe to update the play.
Having arrived at an interpretation, the
translator now needs to provide an
equivalent expression for an English
speaking audience. To express that some
current situation is not of some type, he/she
selects the expression This is no ... or This
isn't ... or some such English equivalent. As
for a situation typical of a bedroom farce of
the sort that Feydeau might write about,
e.g., two people getting caught in a
compromising position by a significant
other,5 the translator checks his/her beliefs
about the audience. If it is assumed that the
addressee of the translation would not
typically believe that Feydeau is a
playwright or that Feydeau wrote bedroom
farces, quite possible for those unfamiliar
with French culture or with the theater, then
reference to Feydeau will fail to have the
intended effect and some alternative
expression must be chosen, e.g., a bedroom
farce or a scene from a bedroom farce.
This leads to the first case of variation in
translation stemming from variations in the
translator's beliefs, namely, those based on
variations in the beliefs the translator
attributes to the addressee of the translation,
the non-French speaking audience of the
film. In the event that the translator assumes
that the film's audience has the same beliefs
about Feydeau as the speaker (Constance)
and the addressee (the unknown person in
the bedroom), he/she would most likely
take advantage of those beliefs to provide a
translation that more closely approximates
the source language utterance in form and
content, relying on the addressees of the
5. There appear to be two scenarios that could be
drawn from a bedroom farce. One involves, as
suggested above, being caught in a compromis-
ing situation by a jealous husband or lover and
thus enduring an unpleasant scene. The other
involves being apprehended by a moral or social
arbiter, so that some unacceptable behavior is
exposed. These two results: jealous rage or
exposure, usually result (at least temporarily in
bedroom farces) in public shame and humilia-
tion, and in possible long-term negative social
consequences such as divorce or loss of posi-
tion.
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translation to use those beliefs appropriately
to interpret Constance's utterance. That is, if
the translator assumes the addressees of the
translation believe that Feydeau is a French
playwright who wrote bedroom farces, then
he/she would most likely have glossed the
utterance, on the basis of the rhetic act,6 as
This is not a scene from Feydeau. In fact, it
appears that the translator assumes that the
non-French speaking audience of the film
has beliefs about Feydeau different from the
beliefs of Constance and the unknown
person in the bedroom, or, perhaps, has no
beliefs about Feydeau at all. Thus, the
translator avoids any expression that would
rely on such beliefs for the interpretation of
the translation and glosses the utterance, on
the basis of the illocutionary act, as This
isn’t a bedroom farce.
A second case of translation variation based
on variations in the beliefs-context concerns
variations in the beliefs of translators about
the world. It is possible, for instance, that
the translator did not have the necessary
beliefs about Feydeau to work out the
intended interpretation. This is, of course,
the bane of translators: lack of the relevant
knowledge of the world, and it is far more
common than appreciated even in extremely
mundane discourse such as general news
articles. It need not, however, deter
translation, even appropriate translation.
When there is a lack of knowledge, the
translator must fall back to an even more
abstract level of interpretation as a basis for
the translation, that of the functional effect
of the utterance. (Or, of course, the
translator could fall back to a translation of
the rhetic act, hoping that his addressees
will be able to interpret what he cannot.) In
our case, Constance is informing the
unknown person in the bedroom that
Coulombe will not be scandalized by their
liaison and that the unknown person in the
bedroom can safely show himself. This may
be accomplished by glossing On va pas
jouer une scène de Feydeau, on the basis of
the intended perlocutionary effect of the
utterance as There's nothing to worry
about; it's safe. This strategy, however, can
be rather dangerous since there is little data
to aid in identifying the specific functional
effect.
Summary
We believe that this example demonstartes
that an approach to language rooted in
pragmatics offers significant advantages
over an approach that sees pragmatics as
simply an additional component of the
language system. In applying this approach
to the field of language translation, we have
shown how such an approach can provide
explanations of the many possible
translations for the same text.
6. We distinguish three levels of interpretation,
which we identify loosely with three of Austin’s
speech acts (Austin 1962). At the first level, the
intent of the speaker is to utter words of a lan-
guage with a more or less definite sense or refer-
ence (p. 95). This is the rhetic act, and it is
interpreted correctly if the hearer can identify
the senses and references intended by the
speaker. This is essentially what is normally
called the semantic content of the utterance.
At a second level of interpretation, the hearer
attempts to understand the actual message that
the speaker wishes to communicate, which may
or, more likely, is not identical with the semantic
comtent, but rather the result of the interference
from this content and other premises drawn
from assumed knowledge or context. We iden-
tify this loosely with the illocutionary act, the
communicative intent of the utterance.
Finally, at the broadest level, there is an intent to
produce a change in the hearer. This change is
the perlocutionary effect of the utterance, and is
an interpretation of what the hearer understands
to be the purpose or goal of the speaker in mak-
ing the utterance.
In the utterance at hand, the semantic content
(rhetic act) is that we are not playing a scene
from Feydeau. The communicative content (illo-
cutionary act) is to tell the addressee that the
current situation is not one in which he need fear
disclosure of his identity. The perlocutionary
intent of the utterance is to encourage the
addressee to come out of the bedroom by assur-
ing him that it is safe to do so.
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Section 2
In this section we present certain concepts
related to a pragmatics-based approach to
Machine Translation and sketch out an
informal processing model. We begin by
developing notions of discourse context and
utterance context and then outline a two-
stage translation process involving
interpretation and translation. Next, we
introduce the notion of "user-friendly
translation" and, finally, conclude with a
discussion of translation equivalence.
Background
As a context for the discussion, we consider
two differing translations into English of el
tercer piso and el segundo piso in the
following Spanish sentence taken from a
news article about the Moscow real estate
market in the early 1990’s.
... los 300 metros cuadrados del tercer
piso estaban disponibles pero fueron
aquilados ..., sólo queda el segundo
piso ....
While one translator has rendered these
expressions as the third floor and the
second floor respectively, another has
rendered them as the fourth floor and the
third floor. Although these two translations
are clearly different, they are, in fact, both
accurate and they are not necessarily
logically inconsistent. The reason resides in
the differing beliefs the translators have
about the beliefs of the author and
addressees of the Spanish text, and of the
audience of the English translation.
We hypothesize that first translator assumes
that the author of the text shares the
translator's floor naming convention (say,
using ground floor, first floor, etc. for the
levels of a building as opposed to first floor,
second floor, etc.) and that the addressees
of the translation also share the translator's
floor naming convention (though it is also
possible that the author and addressees
share a convention which the translator
does not). Thus, the first translator refers to
the fourth level above ground as the third
floor and the third level above ground as
the second floor. If those assumptions are
correct (and we do not have the crucial
information to determine this), then the first
translator’s translation is equivalent at both
the level of the rhetic (semantic) and
illocutionary (communicative) actst.
Otherwise, the translation will be less
equivalent since the addressees of the
translation will have to access information
about alternative floor naming conventions
and make the appropriate inferences in
order to arrive at the author's intended
meaning.
We hypothesize that the second translator
assumes that either the author does not
share the translator's floor naming
convention (say, using first floor, second
floor, etc. vs ground floor, first floor, etc.)
or, alternatively, the addressees of the
translation do not share the author’s floor
naming convention. Thus, the second
translator refers to the fourth level above
ground as the fourth floor and the third
level above ground as the third floor. If
either of those sets of assumptions is correct
(again, we do not have the crucial
information to determine whether they are),
then the second translator's translation is
equivalent at least at the illocutionary level
of communicative content. Otherwise, the
translation will be less equivalent since the
addressees of the translation will have to
access information about alternative floor
naming conventions and make the
appropriate inferences in order to arrive at
the author's intended meaning.
Beliefs and Inferencing
As a framework for modeling the
translation process, we adopt a beliefs
ascription mechanism (such as that of
Ballim & Wilks 1991) for constructing the
relevant, recursively embedded beliefs
spaces of the participants in the translation,
ontologies (such as those of Nirenburg et
al. 1995) for representing the beliefs within
these spaces, and a default inferencing
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engine (such as that of Barnden et al. 1994)
for carrying out the inferencing over these
beliefs within these spaces.
Following Ballim & Wilks 1991, beliefs
about a topic are represented as a box
labeled in the upper left-hand corner.
Beliefs of an agent about a topic are
represented as a box labeled in the lower
center which, in turn, contains a topic box.
The basic default rule for ascribing beliefs
is:
unless there is specific evidence to the
contrary, agent1 ascribes its beliefs to
agent2.
Evidence to the contrary consists of
preexisting beliefs of the target agent that
are contradictory to or inconsistent with the
beliefs being ascribed. We indicate the
application of this rule by an arrow pointing
from the source agent’s environment to the
target agent’s environment. In Figure 1,
Agent1’s beliefs about a topic have been
ascribed to Agent2.
Following Barnden et al. 1994, we further
assume the existence of default (defeasible)
inferencing engine of the sort used in ATT-
Meta. This reasoning mechanism, when
given a goal to prove, will evaluate all
evidence chains that it can find for both the
goal and its negation. Each step in the chain
is given an evidence status (such as certain,
default, possible). The evidence for both the
goal and its negation receives such a status
and a resolution procedure then determines
the evidentiary status of the goal. In the
following example, the rule has a default
status, while the fact is certain. The result
of combining the default rule with the
certain fact is a default status conclusion.
At the same time, ATT-Meta examines
evidence for the goal ¬fly(tweety), such as,
for example, that Tweety is a penguin or
has a broken wing.
Discourse Context
The discourse context consists of beliefs
about particular people, places, events, etc.
(e.g. author and addressee), about
ontological classes of people, objects,
events, etc., about language use and
topic
topic
agent default inference rule: bird(x)→fly(x)
actual fact: bird(tweety)
default conclusion: fly(tweety)
Figure 1: Agent1’s beliefs about a Topic and about Agent2’s beliefs about the Topic
Agent2
Agent2
Agent1
Topic
Topic
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communication and about social and
cultural conventions.
With respect to the specific example under
consideration, the discourse context would
include such beliefs as:
in Europe (and elsewhere), people refer
to the ground level of a multi-story
building as the ground floor, the next
level up as the first floor, and so on,
in the USA (and elsewhere), people refer
to the ground level of a multi-story
building as the first floor, the next
level up as the second floor, and so
on.
It would also include such beliefs as:
the author is a Spanish speaker,
the addressees are Spanish speakers,
Spanish speakers may be Spaniards,
Spaniards are Europeans,
This knowledge may be accessed by the
translator, ascribed to the author or
addressees of the source language text or to
the audience of the translation in order to
establish contextually coherent
interpretations or to select contextually
relevant expressions. We might represent
the contribution of the discourse context for
processing the example as in Figure 2
below.
european (x) → refer-to-as (x, ground level, ground floor)
american (x) → refer-to-as (x, ground-level, first floor)
spanish (x) → european (x).
spanish (author)
european (author)*
refer-to-as (author, ground-level, “ground floor”)*
spanish (addressee)
european (addressee)*
refer-to-as (author, ground-level,
                    “ground floor”)*
* belief resulting from default inferencing using ascribed rules of inference
 author
 translator
 addressee
 addressee
 author
{
Figure 2: Discourse Context
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Utterance Context
The utterance context consists of beliefs
about the objects and events mentioned or
implied during the discourse, the
communicative state of the discourse and
the “open issues” (i.e., the objects or events
whose connections to the context have yet
to be established).
With respect to the specific example under
consideration, the utterance context would
include such beliefs as:
the commercial real estate market in
Moscow is expanding rapidly,
properties are renting at the equivalent of
$700 to $800/m2/year,
properties are renting at the third highest
rates in the world (behind Tokyo and
Hong Kong),
properties are in high demand,
the market is dominated by poverty, legal
uncertainty, the principle of the “rich
get richer”.
This knowledge may also be accessed by
the translator, ascribed to the author or
addressees of the source language text or
the audience of the translation in order to
establish contextually coherent
interpretations or to produce contextually
relevant expressions. We might represent
the contribution of the utterance context for
processing the example as in Figure 3
below.
Interpretation
The process of translation begins with the
translator identifying of the intention of the
author of the source language text. The
translator starts with the assumption that
what the translator knows about source
language conventions, about cultural and
social conventions of source language
speakers and about people's presumed
knowledge of the world is the same as that
which the author knows except where the
translator, explicitly or by implication,
knows that the author's knowledge differs.
Similarly the translator assumes that the
author's knowledge about the source
expanding (commercial-real-estate-market, in Moscow)
rental price (commercial-real-estate, $700-800/m2/year)
relative price (commercial-real-estate, third-highest-in-world)
dominate (market, poverty & legal-uncertainty & law-of-jungle){
  author
 translator
 addressee
 addressee
 author
Figure 3: Utterance Context
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language addressees is the same as the
translator's knowledge of the addressees
except where there is explicit or
implicational evidence to the contrary. This
knowledge, the translator's beliefs modified
by that which the translator knows the
author believes in contradiction to the
translator’s beliefs, constitutes the discourse
context or background context.
The utterance context provides foreground
context for interpretation. The initial
context for processing our example might
include some of the translator’s beliefs
about the participants in the source
language interaction or about the objects
and events described in the text thus far
(such as the belief that the Moscow referred
to is in Russia, etc.). These are represented
below as b1, b2, and b3. It will also include
beliefs the translator assumes the author has
about the objects and events described in
the text thus far (such as the belief that the
real estate market in Moscow is booming,
etc.). These are represented as b4 and b5.
The initial task of the translator, then, is to
assign to the author, for each expression Ei
uttered, an intention based on the form and
semantics of the expression and the beliefs
present in the utterance context. That is, the
expression, Ei, is associated with a semantic
representation, p(a,b), that needs to be
interpreted within the utterance context. For
our example, the expressions el tercer piso
and el segundo piso would be provided with
semantic representations akin to ιx| floor(x)
∧ third(x) and ιx| floor(x) ∧ second(x).
The interpretation involves inferring a
belief (represented alternatively as b6, b8 or
b10) that is informative and compatible with
the utterance context by inferencing from
beliefs in the utterance and discourse
contexts (represented alternatively as b7, b9
or b11). In other words, b6 can be inferred
from p(a,b) and b7 as represented in Figure
4, b8 from p(a,b) and b9 as represented in
Figure 5, and so on. For our example, the
translator might infer that the author is
referring to the fourth and third levels of the
b4
b5
author
translator
addressee
addressee
author
b1
b2
b3
b7
{
b6
Figure 4: SL interpretation 1 (SL—i1)
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building (b6) given that the author and
addressees of the source language text are
Spanish speakers (b2), many Spanish
speakers are European (b3), and Europeans
refer to the ground level of a multi-story
building as the ground floor, the first level
up as the first floor and so on (b7). Other
interpretations (e.g., b8 or b10) are possible
given alternative assumptions about who
believes what (e.g., b9 or b11). Finally, from
Figure 5: SL interpretation 2 (SL — i2)
b4
b5
author
translator
addressee
addressee
author
b1
b2
b3
b9
{
b8
Figure 6: SL interpretation 3 (SL—i3)
b4
b5
author
translator
addressee
addressee
author
b1
b2
b3
b11
{
b10
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these possible interpretations, the translator
selects one as the author’s intention.
Assume in this case that interpretation is the
one described above (b6) and represented
below as SL—i1.
Translation
The second step is for the translator to
express in the target language, with its
different set of linguistic conventions, to the
TL audience, with its different social and
cultural conventions and, perhaps, different
conventional knowledge of the world, the
SL author's intention (b6). The translator
must produce an expression which permits
at least that intention to be identified and,
perhaps, any other possible intentions
supported by the original SL text.
To begin this process, the SL utterance
context prior to the analysis of Ei is
subtracted from the author’s intention, SL
—i1. What remains represents the
information added in processing Ei,
including the beliefs needed to infer the
author’s intention from p(a,b).
The next step is to substitute the discourse
context of the SL interaction with the
discourse context of the TL interaction and
to substitute the utterance context of the SL
author for the utterance context of the
translator (as TL author). This may result in
a change in the beliefs in the TL utterance
context and certainly entails changes in the
TL discourse context. For instance, suppose
that as a result of swapping out the SL
discourse context for the TL discourse
context, b7, the European floor naming
convention is blocked in the TL audience’s
beliefs space by the preexisting b9, that is,
the American floor naming convention.
That is to say, the translator realizes that the
floor naming convention of the audience of
the translation is different from that of the
addressees of the SL text.
The next step is to generate an utterance
Ei∗, with semantic representation p∗(a∗,b∗)
such that one of its interpretations in the
new context is equivalent to the information
derived from Ei, in the original SL context,
i.e., b6. Assuming that the intention of the
translator (as TL author) is to refer to the
fourth and third levels above ground and
assuming that the floor naming convention
of the TL audience in the American one, the
relevant expressions will have semantic
representations akin to ιx| floor(x) ∧
fourth(x) and ιx| floor(x) ∧ third(x), that is,
the fourth floor and the third floor
respectively. This result is represented in
Figure 7.
b1
b2
b3
b9  SL/TL substitutions
translator
addressee
{
Figure 7: TL interpretation 1 (TL—i1)
addressee
b6
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The final step is to provide the possible
alternative interpretations of Ei∗, given the
initial TL discourse context, and TL
utterance context.
Alternative Beliefs Affect Readings
There are many potential scenarios beyond
those presented above which are based on
the observation that the author used Spanish
to addressee the readers of the original
article. For instance, with respect to
interpretation, the translator might consider
as significant the fact that the building
referred to is in Moscow. This, coupled
with the assumption that Russians appear to
follow the US floor-naming convention,
implies that the author was referring to the
third and second levels above ground in the
original text. Alternatively, the translator
might consider as significant the fact that
the real estate agent that was quoted was
speaking Russian. This, again coupled with
the assumption that Russian speakers
appear to follow the US floor-naming
convention, implies that the author
(indirectly through the real estate agent)
was referring to the third and second levels
above ground.
With respect to translation, the translator
might take as relevant the fact the text is
intended for an audience of real-estate
agents and thus the need to identify the
exact level above ground is important. In
that case the translator might have produced
the third or fourth story and the second or
third story as possible translations. Then
again, the translator might take as relevant
the fact the audience of the translation is
uninterested in the precise story referred to
but rather in the general availability of
space. In that case the translator might
appropriately translate the expressions as
one floor and the floor below respectively.
We refer to variations in translation which
are derived from attempting to
accommodate the beliefs of the audience of
the translation as "user-friendly"
translation.
Thus, those facts identified by the translator
as relevant to establishing the author’s
intention or to expressing that intention to a
given audience are crucial to the process. In
addition, since most such assumptions are
simply not evaluable empirically, it is not
obvious that there is any clear notion of
"correct" translation.
Note also that an author's intention is not
necessarily to describe an event or state of
affairs or to present their thoughts on some
topic. It might just as well be to
communicate a mood or emotion, some
sensory input, and so on. Language as a
resource for communication provides the
author with form as well as meaning which
can be manipulated to such ends. Thus,
form cannot be discounted a priori in
translation in the process.
Finally, a "context", while actually very
specific in comparison with all possible
contexts for all possible expressions for
achieving all possible purposes, can be
rather large, abstract, and/or vague (e.g.,
providing coherence with respect to a
Marxist or Freudian or Catholic framework
or some combination of such frameworks).
That is, if a translator can identify one or
another such frameworks as an organizing
principle to the written or spoken discourse,
especially if it can be expressly attributed to
the author, then it too may have to be taken
into account.
Equivalence
A central objective of the approach is to
support a notion of translation equivalence
which is determined by the degree of
overlap between information that is stated
explicitly and that is inferred from the
context in the corresponding source and
target language utterances or texts. That is
to say, we assume that, because of
information gain and information loss
during translation, corresponding source
and target language utterances or texts are
to a greater or lesser degree "equivalent"
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depending on the total information
conveyed.
The processing schema described above can
be used to formally define translation
equivalence not on the basis of the meaning
of a text, but with respect to the
interpretation of the text. We take the
interpretation of the source text to be the
final context of source addressees' beliefs
state less the initial state. This is essentially
the elements explicitly communicated by
the utterance plus the assumptions and
inferences used to support the
interpretation.
By comparing the interpretation (core
statement plus requisite context) of the
source language utterance with the
corresponding interpretation of the target
language translation, we can determine,
beliefs environment by beliefs environment,
which beliefs are shared and which beliefs
are not shared. Thus, for this simple
example case, we end up with an ordered
quadruple consisting of (a) beliefs in source
addressees’ environment that are not in
target addresses' environment; (b) beliefs in
target addressees' environment that are not
in the source addressees’ environment; (c)
beliefs in both environments with possibly
varying levels of confidence; (d) confidence
levels for the interpretations as a whole.
This approach allows us to develop a far
more elaborate notion of translation
equivalence than has been proposed in the
past. First, we can distinguish between the
core equivalence of expressions in source
and target language texts and overall
equivalence. Core equivalence is the
similarity of speaker’s intention for the
corresponding interpretations in source and
target languages (e.g., SL—i1 and TL—i1
or the levels above ground and the beliefs/
inferences required to identify it). The
overall equivalence is the total similarity
(and difference) of the corresponding sets
of interpretations (e.g., SL—i2, SL—i3, ...
and TL—i2, TL—i3, ...).
It also allows us to develop both
quantitative and qualitative notions of
equivalence. Quantitative notions of
equivalence take into account the number
of beliefs/inferences needed to establish the
speaker’s intention (or, more broadly, the
full set of interpretations). Qualitative
notions of equivalence can be defined on
the basis of the beliefs/inferences used;
their “currency”; the “simplicity” of their
connection and so on.
Given this information-rich structure, it is
clear that many different kinds of
``translation equivalence relations'' could be
defined. It should also be clear from the
foregoing that in very few cases will the
interpretations be identical.
Section 3
We have shown in previous sections that
beliefs influence translation and that this is
reflected in the construction of an
interpretation of a text. The interpretation is
constructed from the semantics of the text
in conjunction with additional propositions
needed for integrating that semantics into
the utterance context in a coherent manner.
It is this interpretation, we claim, which
serves as the basis for human translation
and which should serve, as well, as the
basis for automatic translation.
In this section we examine two further
cases which we believe shows that it is just
such a coherent interpretation that underlies
translation. We look at two different
translations of each of two texts. In the first
case, patterns of differences in the
translations can be related to the different
global assumptions of what the story itself
is about. In the second case, patterns of
differences in the translations can be related
to differing world views on the part of the
translators.
Background
The texts and translations used for this
discussion are drawn from a corpus
prepared for the DARPA Machine
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Translation Evaluation in 1994, as reported
in White et al. (1994). The these materials
are available on-line at:
http://ursula.georgetown.edu/mt_web/
index.html.
For this evaluation 300 newspaper texts
(100 each in Spanish, French, and
Japanese) were selected. There was no
restriction as to subject domain. Two
translations of each text into English were
commissioned from two different
translation houses. The translators were
given strict instructions to neither add nor
remove information and to follow a specific
style sheet.
The evaluation was conducted entirely by
native speakers of English, using one of the
English translations as the standard against
which the machine translations were
evaluated. In addition, the second
translation was also evaluated alongside the
machine translations.
Translations were rated for fluency,
informativeness, and adequacy.
Interestingly, when ranked against the first
human translation, the second human
translation (though better than any of the
machine translations) still scored less than
perfect in informativeness and adequacy.
We have examined in detail two of the
articles drawn from the Spanish corpus
along with their accompanying translations.
While these articles were selected precisely
because they seemed to offer interesting
variations in the translations, we do not
believe that they differ significantly from
the other articles.
Methodology
Our methodology of analysis was as
follows. We first processed the Spanish text
using the initial modules of CRL's
Panglyzer Spanish analysis system (Farwell
et al., 1994). This involved first breaking
the text into words and sentences and
tagging each word and item of punctuation
with an identifying part-of-speech tag along
with relevant morphological information.
Next, the output is processed by the
Panglyzer’s phrase recognizer. This groups
words in the input into small chunks that
are semantically and syntactically cohesive
and unambiguous.
Then the two translations were cut up and
aligned with these chunks. In some cases
where two Spanish chunks were translated
by one indivisible English chunk, the two
Spanish chunks were combined into one. In
other cases, a number of aligned English
chunks contained more than one difference
between them. These multiple differences
were broken out. We also examined the two
translations sentence by sentence to look
for differences in syntactic structure that
were not reflected within any particular
chunk.
Finally, we identified and classified each
divergent translation unit (and each
syntactic difference).
Classification
We had three basic categories of
differences: errors, free variation, and
belief-based. That is, we felt that any
difference in translation either reflected an
error or misunderstanding of the text,
reflected an arbitrary choice of expression
having no impact on the meaning or effect
of the text, or reflected a difference in the
meaning or effect of the texts due to
different interpretations of the source
language text. This last category, it should
be emphasized, is quite distinct from the
error category in that we believe that both
of the resulting translations, although
different, are licensed by the source
language text.
There were also some differences that we
refer to as "derivative" in that a difference
in one place resulted in a difference in
another place. For instance, if one translator
used a plural subject where the other used a
singular, that could result in a derivative
difference in the morphology of the verb.
Page 16
Note that this classification is a based on
our understanding of the translator's intent
in choosing a particular translation and not
simply on the exterior form of the
translation. We also note that, as a result, it
might be possible in any particular case to
argue for a different classification, based on
one's own understanding of the text and of
the translation. However, the current
findings are the result of agreement
between the two authors and so have a
certain degree of reliability.
Errors. The error category was the smallest
of the three classes of differences. This was
to be expected since both translations were
done by qualified translators. We identified
three types of errors. First there are errors
that are unintentional or accidental in
nature. Spelling errors, for example,
generally fall into this category. The second
type are errors or extreme awkwardness in
the translation due to interference from the
source language text. The third class of
error consists of intentional errors in that it
appears that the translator did not just
overlook something but rather got it wrong.
That is, the source language text not only
did not provide a basis for the translation
but rather appeared to provide a basis for a
contradictory translation.
Free Variation. The second category we
examined was free variation. To some
extent this is a flexible category. That is, at
the strictest level, there were cases where
we could see absolutely no differences in
semantic content, connotations, style,
register, or invited inferences. These would
include such differences as the use (or non-
use) of a definite article with plural nouns,
writing out numbers versus using numerals,
or the use of that versus which as a relative
pronoun. At a less restrictive level, we
included cases where there were differences
between the lexical choices, but it was not
clear that they could be related directly to
differing beliefs about the text. An example
here is the translation of sectores in
sectores costeros as either coastal area or
coastal sector. Sector has a slightly more
military or formal feel than area, but not
enough for us to classify this as a belief-
based difference.
Belief-based Differences. In this category
we placed all translation differences that we
felt communicated substantially different
information, enough so that the readers of
the differing translations would have
different ideas as to the nature of the source
text or the events described in that text.
These differences, however, were not such
that one could, on the basis of the source
text, identify them as wrong or incorrect.
We identified two subtypes of belief-based
differences. The first consisted primarily of
additions or alterations of information that
are related to the beliefs of the translator
about the target language audience. That is,
information was added or altered if it was
felt necessary to communicate the source
language author’s intent to the target
audience properly. Similarly, information
may have been deleted if it was redundant
and could be recovered from context.
The second subtype of belief-based
differences include those that are related to
the beliefs of the translators about the
events recounted in the source text or on the
attitudes of the participants (including the
source language author) about these events.
Of the two subtypes, these are easily the
most common.
Results
The results of our analysis for both texts are
presented in Table 1. As can be seen, the
results are substantially in agreement.
About 40% of the segments in each text
showed differences in the translations. Of
these differences, there are few outright
errors, as one might expect from qualified,
professional translators, working under
strict guidelines. Of the remaining
differences, they are split about half and
half between free variation and belief-based
differences.
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We expected to find a certain number of
cases where the different beliefs of the
translators about the world (and therefore
about the events described in the source
text) influenced their translations. And we
did. What we did not necessarily expect
was that the large majority of these
differences patterned on the basis of either
differing, yet internally consistent, overall
interpretations of the source language
article or differing global views of the
translators. To demonstrate this, we
examine each text in more detail.
Text 1: Earthquakes in Chile
The news event which triggered the original
article was an unusual increase in the
purchases of living necessities in a Chilean
port city, following newspaper and radio
reports about the possibility of an
earthquake striking the city. The
governmental Office of Emergencies
(ONEMI) is a major source for this portion
(the first half) of the article. The second
half of the article is devoted to a more
general discussion, supported by quotes
from appropriate scientists, about the actual
likelihood of an earthquake and its
predictability.
A key factor in forming the translators
interpretations of the article appears to be
their understanding of the goals and
reliability of the Office of Emergency
(ONEMI) source. If the goals of ONEMI
are understood as helpful, then they may be
relied upon as a source of correct
information. One may take at face value
their criticism of the news media for
blowing the earthquake reports out of
proportion and encouraging irrational
behavior among the populace. The second
half of the article validates this view by
showing that from a scientific perspective
there is both little cause for alarm and not
much that one can do anyway in
preparation.
On the other hand, if one suspects that the
goals of the ONEMI source may be self-
serving, then their information may be
biased. It could be that the ONEMI source
is trying to save face for the organization
which currently has egg on it for not having
encouraged reasonable preparations for an
impending disaster and for not being ready
Text 1 Text 2
Data
Number of words 403 392
Number of phrases 170 192
Number of phrases with differences 66 87
Percentage of phrases with differences 39% 45%
Differences
Errors 13 14
Unintentional (6) (3)
Interference (6) (7)
Wrong interpretation (1) (4)
Free Variation 32 38
Belief-based 36 39
Source Text Related (30) (37)
Target Audience Related (6) (2)
Derivatives: (12)
=== ===
Total: 81 91
Table 1:  Quantitative Results
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to deal with the naturally upset citizens.
One way to do so is to blame others (in this
case, irresponsible media). This view is
confirmed by the second half of the article,
showing that from a scientific perspective
there have been advances in predicting
earthquakes and that sensing devices are in
place.
These two different evaluations then hook
up with different understandings of what
kind of story is being written. If one takes
the first analysis, then the story fits nicely
into a "blame the media" framework in
which the accuracy or quality of media
reporting of an event itself becomes the
subject of another news media story.
On the other hand, if one takes the second
analysis, this fits in nicely with a "blame the
government" framework in which
incompetence by government bureaucrats is
the key element of the story, often
accompanied by an attempt at covering up
the incompetence.
These two broad interpretations of the
source language author’s intent are
encapsulated in the translations of the
headline shown below:
Accumulación de víveres por anuncios
sísmicos in Chile.
Hoarding Caused by Earthquake Pre-
dictions in Chile.
STOCKPILING OF PROVISIONS
BECAUSE OF PREDICTED EARTH-
QUAKES IN CHILE.
In this one phrase there are three
differences between the two translations:
(1) Hoarding versus STOCKPILING OF
PROISIONS for Accumulación de víveres;
(2) Caused by versus BECAUSE OF for por
and (3) Earthquake Predictions versus
PREDICTED EARTHQUAKES for
anuncios sísmicos. In the first translation,
irrational, selfish behavior (hoarding) is
related by a causal chain (caused by) to an
irresponsible speech act (prediction) about a
hypothetical future event. In the second
headline, on the other hand, rational activity
(stockpiling) is based rationally (because
of) on expectations of a future catastrophe
(predicted earthquakes). In the first
translated headline, it is the predictions of
earthquakes that are at the center of the
story, while in the second, it is the
earthquakes themselves that form the focus
for the story.
Another clue to this difference of
interpretation is in the translations of:
La posibilidad de un remezón desas-
troso... tuvo un tratamiento inadecuado
en recientes versiones periodísticas,...
criticó la repartición.
Here the second translator keeps the
structure of the Spanish sentence
(grammatically incorrect in English) in
which criticar (to criticize) takes as its
direct object the criticism itself:
The possibility of a disastrous
tremor...received inadequate treatment
in recent newspaper versions,...criti-
cized the office.
The first translator, however, in keeping
with an understanding that the media
exaggeration is at the heart of the story,
chose to use the verb say, but then to
indicate explicitly that the report was
critical of the media:
The possibility of a disastrous
tremor...was inadequately treated in
recent news stories,...said the release,
which was critical of the media.
The first translator, then, understands there
to be an entire report (repartición, general
sense) issued by the Office for Emergencies
as critical of the media, while the second
translator envisions only a general comment
from the office (repartición, usage in
Chile), perhaps an attempt on the part of a
government bureaucrat to deflect the tough
questioning of the reporter.
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If these two differing interpretations of the
events in the story do, in fact, underlie the
two different translation, we would expect
to find certain other patterns as well. We
would expect, for instance, that the first
translator, focussing on the local response
to the media misunderstanding, should
choose translations which play up the
irrational behavior of the local inhabitants,
translations that emphasize the
unpredictability of earthquakes (and so the
implausibility of suddenly preparing for
them), and play down the seriousness of
such an earthquake, should it occur. The
second translator, focussing on the ill-
prepared ONEMI, should do just the
opposite: play up the rationality of the
response of the people to an earthquake that
can be accurately predicted to occur soon,
with very serious consequences. And,
indeed, this is what we find. Without going
into all the details, we found that 21 of the
30 source-text related, belief-based
differences were supportive of the general
hypothesis and its corollaries.
Text 2: Trial in Amazonia
The second text was a news story about the
beginning of the trial of a former policeman
accused of murdering two brothers, who
were instrumental in a labor union in rural
Amazonia. The accusation was that the
policeman had been hired to commit the
killing, and the article goes into some detail
about the background of labor violence in
the province.
In this article, the results of our study were
very similar to those of the first article.
There were not many errors and the
majority of differences were split between
free variants and belief-related differences.
The large majority of the belief-related
differences (30 out of 36) were related to
the source text interpretation, while a
smaller number were related to (assumed)
beliefs of the target language audience.
As with the first article, we also found that
the large majority of the belief-related
differences reflected a broad consistent
pattern of differences between the two
translations. However, in this case the
patterns reflected the two translators’
different general world views, particularly
those relating to economics and politics.
Briefly put, the first translator views the
article from what would generally be called
a left-wing perspective, while the second
translator seems to translate from a more
conservative position.
Hovy (Hovy 1988) has shown that the
rhetorical goals of speakers influence how
their communications of the same event are
realized differently in different situations by
different speakers and has modeled this for
a natural language generator, PAULINE.
What we find here is that even translations
of a single text describing a particular event
differ according to the rhetorical stance of
the translator and, in this case, according to
the translator’s political and economic
understanding of the world.
So, for instance, the first (left-wing)
translator translates sindicalista (describing
the murdered brothers) as labor leader
while the second (right-wing) translator
simply uses union member. In translating
the Spanish asesino and asesinado, the
policeman on trial is described by the first
translator as an assassin who has
assassinated the victims, while the second
translator describes him as a killer who has
murdered the victims. The first translator
translates campesino as peasant and
terrateniente as landholder while the
second translates these terms as small
farmer and landowner. Similarly, the
second translator shows more respect by
translation policía as police officer, justicia
as justice, and jueza as the Court in contrast
to the first translator’s policeman, law and
judge, respectively.
In short, the first translator translates the
article from the perspective of a leftist
political analysis, where the economically-
deprived working classes are in conflict
with the upper-class wealthy landowners,
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who can use the apparatus of the
government to enforce their class interests,
and, in the face of strong opposition, may
even resort to extra-legal means to maintain
their position.
The second translator sees the article from a
more conservative perspective. The trial is
bringing the killer to justice, despite an
atmosphere of violence brought on by the
large scale union organizing.
In all, 30 out of the 37 source text-related,
beliefs-based differences reflected this
underlying difference in world view.
Summary
Overall the important conclusions we draw
from these analyses are as follows. (1) Even
given strict instructions, competent
translators will frequently produce different
translations, even of simple newspaper
texts. (2) Many of these differences result
in translations that are not synonymous.
They may differ in actual content,
emotional effect, or implied
presuppositions. Nonetheless both
translations reflect responsible
interpretations of the source text. (3) In the
two articles examined, most of these
meaningful translation differences could be
related to an underlying difference in
interpretation or understanding of the text
as a whole.
Conclusions
With respect to translation, a pragmatics-
based approach provides a much more
explicit framework for reasoning about the
many choices that translators must make in
producing a translation. But the central
assumption of the approach is that language
is vague and texts radically underspecify
the interpretation. This is why translators
must interpret utterances against a context
of beliefs about the world, about the
elements of the utterance context, and about
the topic and related individuals and states-
of-affairs.
The primary implication of this approach to
translation is that the beliefs of the
translator and the way in which the
translator reasons with them account for the
eventual form of the translation. Those
beliefs and that reasoning should therefore
be the focus of any critical analysis of
translation quality. We need to ask:
• which beliefs are supported by the text
(and how),
• which beliefs are supported by world
knowledge (and how),
• which beliefs are supported by
linguistic conventions (and how),
• which beliefs are supported by socio-
cultural conventions (and how).
If the answers to these questions are
satisfactory, the translation is satisfactory.
If they are less than satisfactory, then so too
is the translation.
From the perspective of a pragmatics-based
model of translation and in view of the
widespread and significant translation
variants to be expected from both human
and machine translation systems, it should
be clear that the focus of evaluation should
be on (1) the similarity and difference
between the beliefs of the participants and
the inferences performed during the source
and target language interactions, and (2) on
the naturalness of expression of the target
language text. It should also be clear that
there is a wide range of potentially
appropriate translations for a given
interaction. Since variations in translation
arise from differences in participants’
beliefs and since each of the participants
(translator, author, reader and audience) has
a different and incomplete knowledge of
the individuals, objects, situations and
events referred to in a communicative
interaction, the potential for variation is
quite large.
Finally, we feel that a pragmatics-based
approach to machine translation offers the
only direct assault on the issues raised by
Bar-Hillel as early as 1959 (Bar-Hillel,
1960). It is not simply that MT systems
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need knowledge, they need to be able to
create complex structures of beliefs and to
be able to reason within those structures in
order to arrive at an appropriate
interpretation in spite of incomplete or
possibly inconsistent knowledge. To ignore
this fact is to delay progress on both
theoretical and applied MT. Form-based
translation cannot work: It must be
supported by inferencing from knowledge
within a context.
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